Panzram
06-27-2004, 04:33 AM
The remaking of the major league bullpen has begun, only a year after the status quo was starting to look invincible.
During the first few months of this season, teams have taken baby steps away from the bullpen model of the last two decades, in which managers essentially allowed a single statistic to dictate their strategy. Closers took the mound only when they could be awarded a save and usually when that save would be as easy as possible. Entering the game with the bases empty and pitching no more than an inning became the norm.
Who, after all, would want Eric Gagne, the nastiest reliever in years, getting your team out of a jam when you could have a journeyman trying to do so? As a matter of fact, some of today's managers would.
The game's established closers - the ones who have been doing the job for at least a couple of seasons - are coming into more games this year when a runner is on base than they did in either of the last two years. One-sixth of their appearances in 2004 have come with a runner on, up from one-eighth last year. The closers are also pitching longer than an inning slightly more frequently than in the past. And the portion of their appearances that do not qualify for saves, such as when they enter a tie game, has risen to 41 percent this year from 37 percent in 2003. It is all a small triumph of good sense over tradition.
"There's more of a situational awareness," said Chris Antonetti, assistant general manager of the Cleveland Indians. The idea, he added, is to "use your best relievers at the most critical, highly leveraged point in the game."
Marlins Manager Jack McKeon did exactly that on May 20 when he handed the ball to closer Armando Benitez with his team ahead of the Astros, 6-2, and two outs in the eighth inning. But with the bases loaded and Lance Berkman, the Astros' best hitter, coming to bat, McKeon saw it as the game's signature moment. Benitez struck out Berkman on a sinker that kissed the outside corner of the plate and then set down the Astros in order in the ninth. It was one of 11 times, through Friday, that Benitez entered a game with at least one runner on base.
To somebody coming to baseball for the first time, all this would seem blazingly obvious. Of course a team should use its best pitchers when it absolutely needs to get an out, the same way that a basketball team turns to its finest jump shooter when it needs a basket.
But starting in the 1980's, teams began becoming slaves to the save rule. Even with the recent changes, top relievers still regularly pitch the ninth inning with a three-run lead, one of the most painless routes to a save.
"To be honest with you, it's driven by the fact that it's a stat that the players get paid for," said Jim Colborn, the Dodgers' pitching coach. "It's a part of baseball I don't particularly like."
Even an average pitcher protects a three-run lead about 97 percent of the time. Elite relievers can have a much greater effect when their team, say, has a two-run lead in the eighth inning, there are no outs and the bases are loaded. Facing that threat, a team goes on to win just 48 percent of the time, said Ben Polak, an economist at Yale, and Brian Lonergan, an economic consultant. They have studied the chances of victory in every game situation. If the team gets out of the jam - and who better to make that happen than Mariano Rivera or John Smoltz? - the odds soar to 92 percent.
"A single with the bases loaded costs you two runs," Antonetti said. "A single to lead off the next inning doesn't."
The reform rumblings began last year, when the Red Sox said they would use their best reliever whenever they thought he could make the biggest difference. "Using your relief ace to protect a three-run lead," Bill James, the statistical maven who advises the Red Sox, has written, "is like a business using a top executive to negotiate fire insurance."
The only problem for the Red Sox early last season was that their best reliever was neither obvious nor very good. On opening day, the bullpen blew a lead to lowly Tampa Bay and performed little better in the weeks that followed. Pedro MartÃ*nez, Boston's ace, grumbled about the plan. The dean of Boston's sports columnists, Dan Shaughnessy, compared it to New Coke.
During the off-season, the team signed Keith Foulke, one of the best closers, in what seemed like the ultimate bow to conformity. But Foulke is actually part of the changes. When Red Sox Manager Terry Francona was asked why he did not hold back Foulke for a save situation during an extra-inning victory over the Yankees on April 24 and instead pitched him for two innings when the score was tied, he told reporters, "That holding stuff, it's not going to happen." Less than half of Foulke's 2004 appearances have come during save situations.
The reforms remain fairly minor so far, but a small amount of progress is still progress. You will know teams have taken the next step when they no longer leave their closer in the bullpen during a tie game, only to lose and then bring him to the mound during a blowout a few nights later to get him some work, as managers say. There are more than enough meaningful innings to keep a top reliever busy.
During the first few months of this season, teams have taken baby steps away from the bullpen model of the last two decades, in which managers essentially allowed a single statistic to dictate their strategy. Closers took the mound only when they could be awarded a save and usually when that save would be as easy as possible. Entering the game with the bases empty and pitching no more than an inning became the norm.
Who, after all, would want Eric Gagne, the nastiest reliever in years, getting your team out of a jam when you could have a journeyman trying to do so? As a matter of fact, some of today's managers would.
The game's established closers - the ones who have been doing the job for at least a couple of seasons - are coming into more games this year when a runner is on base than they did in either of the last two years. One-sixth of their appearances in 2004 have come with a runner on, up from one-eighth last year. The closers are also pitching longer than an inning slightly more frequently than in the past. And the portion of their appearances that do not qualify for saves, such as when they enter a tie game, has risen to 41 percent this year from 37 percent in 2003. It is all a small triumph of good sense over tradition.
"There's more of a situational awareness," said Chris Antonetti, assistant general manager of the Cleveland Indians. The idea, he added, is to "use your best relievers at the most critical, highly leveraged point in the game."
Marlins Manager Jack McKeon did exactly that on May 20 when he handed the ball to closer Armando Benitez with his team ahead of the Astros, 6-2, and two outs in the eighth inning. But with the bases loaded and Lance Berkman, the Astros' best hitter, coming to bat, McKeon saw it as the game's signature moment. Benitez struck out Berkman on a sinker that kissed the outside corner of the plate and then set down the Astros in order in the ninth. It was one of 11 times, through Friday, that Benitez entered a game with at least one runner on base.
To somebody coming to baseball for the first time, all this would seem blazingly obvious. Of course a team should use its best pitchers when it absolutely needs to get an out, the same way that a basketball team turns to its finest jump shooter when it needs a basket.
But starting in the 1980's, teams began becoming slaves to the save rule. Even with the recent changes, top relievers still regularly pitch the ninth inning with a three-run lead, one of the most painless routes to a save.
"To be honest with you, it's driven by the fact that it's a stat that the players get paid for," said Jim Colborn, the Dodgers' pitching coach. "It's a part of baseball I don't particularly like."
Even an average pitcher protects a three-run lead about 97 percent of the time. Elite relievers can have a much greater effect when their team, say, has a two-run lead in the eighth inning, there are no outs and the bases are loaded. Facing that threat, a team goes on to win just 48 percent of the time, said Ben Polak, an economist at Yale, and Brian Lonergan, an economic consultant. They have studied the chances of victory in every game situation. If the team gets out of the jam - and who better to make that happen than Mariano Rivera or John Smoltz? - the odds soar to 92 percent.
"A single with the bases loaded costs you two runs," Antonetti said. "A single to lead off the next inning doesn't."
The reform rumblings began last year, when the Red Sox said they would use their best reliever whenever they thought he could make the biggest difference. "Using your relief ace to protect a three-run lead," Bill James, the statistical maven who advises the Red Sox, has written, "is like a business using a top executive to negotiate fire insurance."
The only problem for the Red Sox early last season was that their best reliever was neither obvious nor very good. On opening day, the bullpen blew a lead to lowly Tampa Bay and performed little better in the weeks that followed. Pedro MartÃ*nez, Boston's ace, grumbled about the plan. The dean of Boston's sports columnists, Dan Shaughnessy, compared it to New Coke.
During the off-season, the team signed Keith Foulke, one of the best closers, in what seemed like the ultimate bow to conformity. But Foulke is actually part of the changes. When Red Sox Manager Terry Francona was asked why he did not hold back Foulke for a save situation during an extra-inning victory over the Yankees on April 24 and instead pitched him for two innings when the score was tied, he told reporters, "That holding stuff, it's not going to happen." Less than half of Foulke's 2004 appearances have come during save situations.
The reforms remain fairly minor so far, but a small amount of progress is still progress. You will know teams have taken the next step when they no longer leave their closer in the bullpen during a tie game, only to lose and then bring him to the mound during a blowout a few nights later to get him some work, as managers say. There are more than enough meaningful innings to keep a top reliever busy.